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Abstract 
Introduction In England, in 2006, new dental contracts devolved commissioning of dental services 
locally to Primary Care Trusts to meet the needs of their local population. The new national General 
Dental Services contracts (nGDS) were based on payment for Units of Dental Activity (UDAs) 
awarded in three treatment bands based on complexity of care. Recently, contract currency in UK 
deŶtistrǇ is eǀolǀiŶg froŵ UDAs ďased oŶ ǀoluŵe aŶd Đase ĐoŵpleǆitǇ toǁards ͚ďleŶded ĐoŶtraĐts͛ 
that include incentives linked with key performance indicators such as quality and improved health 
outcome. Overall, evidence of the effectiveness of incentive-driven contracting of health providers is 
still emerging. The INCENTIVE Study aims to evaluate a blended contract model (incentive-driven) 
compared to traditional nGDS contracts on dental service delivery in practices in West Yorkshire, 
England.  
Methods and analysis The INCENTIVE model uses a mixed methods approach to comprehensively 
evaluate a new incentive-driven model of NHS dental service delivery. The study includes 6 dental 
surgeries located across three newly commissioned dental practices (blended contract) and three 
existing traditional practices (nGDS contracts). The newly commissioned practices have been 
matched to traditional practices by deprivation index, age profile, ethnicity, size of practice and 
taking on new patients. The study consists of three interlinked work packages: a qualitative study to 
explore stakeholder perspectives of the new service delivery model; an effectiveness study to assess 
the INCENTIVE model in reducing the risk of and amount of dental disease and enhance oral health-
related quality of life in patients; and an economic study to assess cost-effectiveness of the 
INCENTIVE model in relation to clinical status and oral health-related quality of life.  
Ethics and dissemination The study has been approved by NRES Committee London, Bromley. The 
results of this study will be disseminated at national and international conferences and in 
international journals.  
 HEALTH ECONOMICS 
 ORAL MEDICINE 
 PUBLIC HEALTH 
 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
Strengths and limitations of this study 
 The INCENTIVE model will ensure a robust evaluation of dental practices piloting blended 
dental contracts that reflect innovative use of skill mix, evidence-based care pathways, 
funding and quality indicators.  
 A rigorous mixed methods scientific approach will add considerable evidence over and 
above any evaluations of the pilots being undertaken, which are largely limited to survey-
based evaluations.  
 While this is not a randomised controlled trial, the mixed methods offer insight into not only 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness but also into the process of contractual change for the 
stakeholders, which is important for any subsequent national roll out and implementation of 
the new dental contracts.  
Previous SectionNext SectionIntroduction 
In England, in 2006, new dental contracts devolved commissioning of dental services locally to 
Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) to meet the needs of their local population. The new national General 
Dental Services contracts (nGDS) were based on payment for Units of Dental Activity (UDAs) 
awarded in three treatment bands based on the complexity of each patient's care. The contracted 
number of UDAs was based on historic activity. The nGDS contracts meant that the payment 
mechanism changed from a one-off fee per item of service to a system whereby providers are paid 
aŶ aŶŶual suŵ iŶ returŶ for deliǀeriŶg aŶ agreed Ŷuŵďer of ͚Đourses of treatŵeŶt͛ ǁeighted for 
complexity.  
There is an increasing trend to use incentives in UK NHS primary care.
1
 Within dentistry this 
ŵaŶifests as ĐhaŶges to deŶtal praĐtitioŶers͛ ĐoŶtraĐtual arraŶgeŵeŶts. LoĐal ĐoŵŵissioŶiŶg 
allowed modifications that may have been influenced by the Steele Review
2
 of NHS dentistry, which 
recommended that payments explicitly recognise prevention and reward the contribution of the 
dental team to improvements to oral health, reflected in patient progression along the pathway, 
compliance with nationally agreed clinical guidelines and the achievement of expected outcomes (ref. 
2, p.67). In addition, commissioners were asked to support dentists to make best and most cost 
effective use of the available dental workforce.
2
 
Thus contract currency in UK dentistry is evolving from UDAs based on volume and case complexity 
toǁards ͚ďleŶded ĐoŶtraĐts͛ that iŶĐlude iŶĐeŶtiǀes liŶked ǁith key performance indicators such as 
quality and improved health outcome.
2
 Overall, evidence of the effectiveness of incentive-driven 
contracting of health providers is still emerging. A review by Christianson et al
3
 found mixed results 
of the effect of payer initiatives that reward providers for quality improvements whereas Clarkson et 
al
4
 found targeted payments to be a cost-effective intervention in changing a clinician's behaviour, 
with significant improvement in professional practice.
4
 O'Donnell et al
5
 found within the new 
General Medical Services contracts in primary care that the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) 
incentivised performance, motivating staff towards QOF targets. Similarly, a review by McDonald et 
al
1
 of the effect of incentives on the primary care workforce found them to be powerful motivators. 
A more granular view suggests that their process-based nature may limit their long-term effects on 
health outcomes.
6
 There is also a danger that important activities that lack a target may be 
underemphasised.
6
 ,
7
 
In order to inform an appropriate model of care to maintain and improve oral health, a number of 
dental contracts have been locally commissioned focused on oral health improvement and quality, in 
addition, national pilots are underway in England developed by the Department of Health. All share 
common features of being capitation based, of having a quality element, of conferring a 
responsibility for long-term care of the patient on the contract holder and of being based on an oral 
health assessment (OHA) and pathway.
8
 
The INCENTIVE Study aims to evaluate a blended contract model (incentive-driven) compared to 
traditional nGDS contracts on dental service delivery in practices in West Yorkshire, England to 
generate information that will be of value for designing and commissioning future NHS dental 
services.  
Methods and analysis 
Study objectives 
 To explore stakeholder perspectives of the new blended contract service delivery model. We 
will also explore whether these practices already operating an incentive-driven service 
delivery by a multidisciplinary team are able to adapt more readily to the introduction of 
further new dental contracts as these will be negotiated during the study period.  
 To assess the effectiveness of the new service delivery model in reducing the risk of and 
amount of dental disease and enhancing oral health-related quality of life in patients.  
 To assess cost-effectiveness of the new service delivery model in relation to oral health-
related quality of life. 
Design 
The INCENTIVE model will use a mixed methods approach combining qualitative and quantitative 
techniques to comprehensively evaluate a new incentive-driven model of NHS dental service 
delivery. The study will include 6 dental surgeries located across three newly commissioned dental 
practices (blended contract) and three existing traditional practices (nGDS contracts) in West 
Yorkshire (3 in each of the two arms). The newly commissioned practices have been matched to 
traditional practices by deprivation index, age profile, ethnicity, size of practice and taking on new 
patients.  
The study consists of three interlinked work packages: a qualitative study to explore stakeholder 
perspectives of the new service delivery model and whether those practices already operating 
incentive-driven service delivery by a multidisciplinary team are ready to adapt more readily to a 
new dental contract; an effectiveness study to assess the effectiveness of the INCENTIVE model in 
reducing the risk of and amount of dental disease and enhance oral health-related quality of life in 
patients; and a cost-effectiveness study to assess cost-effectiveness of the INCENTIVE model in 
relation to clinical status and oral health-related quality of life. An overview of the study 
incorporating the three work packages is contained in figure 1.  
 Figure 1 
Flow diagram INCENTIVE study. 
Setting 
Focus lies on a new blended dental contract introduced in 2007 for three newly commissioned NHS 
dental practices in West Yorkshire. The specification was innovative and although pre-dating the 
Steele Review,
2
 it reflected its ethos and recommendations with emphasis on quality of care, 
achieving health outcomes and patient-reported outcome measures (PROMS).
9
 
In brief, 60% of the contract value is apportioned to delivery of a set number of UDAs. The remaining 
40% is dependent on the delivery of quality—20% systems, processes, infrastructure (eg, dental 
standards of quality and safety overseen by The Care Quality Commission) and 20% oral health 
improvement (OHImp). The framework is an evolving mechanism for improving oral health and 
monitoring outcomes within the practices. The outcomes for year 1 involved focusing on ensuring 
that the foundations were in place for the care pathway approach to evidence-based preventive 
care, including appropriate skill mix, staff training, reviewing practice and community profiles.  
The new contracts are aimed at: ensuring that evidence-based preventive interventions
10
 are 
delivered in line with identified needs for a defined population; ensuring increased access to 
dentistry; and ensuring that care is provided by the most appropriate team member to encourage 
skill mix. All practices fully utilise skill mix and have hygiene therapists and additional skills dental 
nurses.  
The contracts encourage a care pathway approach in which all patients should be assessed formally 
on joining the practice and at each subsequent recall. Four sets of information (age group, medical 
history, social history (self-care, habits/diet) and clinical assessment) are used to inform a traffic-
light system for patients with high (red), medium (amber) or low (green) risk of oral disease (refer to 
figure 2). This type of traffic-light system has not been fully explored, although early work is ongoing 
in the North West of England.
11
 The patient care pathway includes evidence-based prevention and 
advice, appropriate recall interval and restorative care as appropriate (red risk category treatment 
ďeiŶg liŵited to staďilisatioŶ aŶd loǁeriŶg risk statusͿ. PatieŶts͛ status is reǀieǁed at their next OHA 
allowing them to move between risk categories.  
 
Figure 2 
͚TraffiĐ Light͛ risk assessŵeŶt. 
Within practice monitoring ensures evidence-based prevention is delivered in line with identified 
needs and monitors access to dentistry. Oral health improvement is assessed through the delivery of 
a performance framework. Payment is linked to three elements: a register by age group of those 
having risk assessment, management of care appropriate to need and evidence base, and the 
measurement of oral health outcomes.  
Qualitative study 
A qualitative study will explore the meaning of key aspects of the new service delivery model for 
three discrete stakeholder groups: (1) public and patients (ie, both non-patients and patients); (2) 
commissioners and (3) the primary care dental teams. Preliminary observational studies will help 
develop topic guides for subsequent semistructured interviews and focus groups. Recruitment will 
continue until no new variation in observations can be found (saturation). If necessary, additional 
participants will be identified using theoretical sampling. For planning purposes, we anticipate 
conducting approximately five interviews, with three focus groups having four or more participants 
within each stakeholder group.  
The sampling matrix for the public and patient group will include criteria linked to the objectives of 
the programme, including demographic factors (age, gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status), risk 
category, treatment need and participation in the user forum. Broad eligibility criteria at the 
participating practices will recruit patients: aged 16 years and over; willing to be interviewed and to 
give informed consent; if a translator is needed provision of translation services in the spoken 
language of the participant will be available via the normal dental practice access routes to such 
services.  
As the new contracting model considers access to care it is important that the sample includes non-
patients. 
A mixture of approaches will be used to recruit people who may not engage with local dental care 
services, such as the employment of snowball sampling techniques and site-based approaches to 
recruitment. However, snowball sampling used alone can result in biased samples and it is important 
that any sample recruited to the study adequately represents the target population. In order to 
achieve this goal specific attention may be required for adequate recruitment of participants from 
different groups of the community. Therefore, a site-based approach will be used to control bias and 
obtain a more representative sample. A representative list of sites (eg, places, organisations or 
services), which may include churches, community centres, social clubs or housing projects, will be 
identified, with the researcher contacting the ͚gatekeeper͛ for eaĐh of these sites ;eg, ĐhurĐh pastorͿ 
so that the study can be explained; the gatekeeper's help in recruitment can also be enlisted and the 
researcher can collect information about the number and characteristics of site members.  
Commissioners will comprise commissioning staff, general dental practice advisors and consultants 
in Dental Public Health. Staff members will be recruited from the primary care dental teams from 
the six participating practices as well as those that may have recently left them as it is important to 
capture the potential impact of working under these different models of service delivery and their 
professional satisfaction. Staff will comprise the full skill mix within the practices. As with previous 
work,
1
 we will pay particular attention to the way in which the INCENTIVE model promotes greater 
participation from the entire dental team.  
Transcripts of the interviews and focus groups will be analysed with framework analysis. The first 
stage will involve familiarisation with the data to verify and, if necessary, revise the framework in the 
light of emerging themes. The revised framework forms an index, allowing the data in the transcripts 
to be labelled according to each theme. The data will then be sorted by theme to enable constant 
comparison across themes and cases. The goal of our analysis will be to establish typologies for 
participation, health improvement, access, professional involvement and care pathways. These 
typologies will identify the general nature of each of these aspects and will enable us to analyse the 
way in which the emerging model can develop new directions for primary care dentistry. The 
findings will be triangulated with a range of literatures including definitions of health, current policy, 
access, quality and public involvement.  
The study focuses on innovative commissioning models that are commissioned within a real-world 
environment. Should a new national contract or indeed local commissioning arrangements be 
introduced during the study period, the study will examine the impact of the change and differences 
between the innovative and traditional models in adapting to implementing the new contractual 
model.  
Effectiveness study 
The key characteristics of the traditional and new model incentive-driven practices are summarised 
in table 1. A non-randomised natural experiment will compare three incentive-driven dental 
practices with the three matched traditional practices. The practices are matched by size, number of 
dentists, location and patient demographics. The primary outcome will be gingivitis measured as the 
proportion of sites that bleed on probing (BOP). Secondary/exploratory outcomes include oral 
health-related quality of life (OHIP-14) and generic health-related quality of life (EQ-5D). The dental 
caries experience will be recorded using the International Caries Detection and Assessment System 
(ICDAS).  
Table 1 
Key characteristics of the traditional and new model incentive practices under evaluation in the INCENTIVE study 
Characteristics 
Traditional (comparator) practices (3 practices; 10 dental 
surgeries) 
Incentive practices (3 practices; 10 dental surgeries) 
Model of operation Traditional Incentive driven 
Contract type nGDS0 An incentive-driven contract (a blended contract combining nGDS and incentives)  
Mode of reimbursement 
Activity-based, weighted bands of dental activity 
Contract currency—UDA  
Activity: 60% of contract value UDAs 
Incentives: (1) Quality systems, processes infrastructure (eg, cross infection, standards 
for better health 0: 20% of contract value, and (2) Oral health improvement: 20% 
contract value  
Incentives and levers 
Driven by delivery of UDAs, with no incentives for 
prevention approach 
Allocation of payment allows commissioners to incentivise key structures, processes 
and outcomes for quality and oral health improvement  
Health professional responsible for 
delivery of care 
Dentist (with no incentives for therapist and hygienist 
support) 
Blended contract incentivises use of skill mix to deliver preventative focused care 
For example, dental therapists can extract baby teeth, place fillings and apply 
preventative medicaments. Dental nurses may give preventative fluoride varnish to 
teeth  
Care pathway and recall 
Care pathway and recall as prescribed by individual 
performers 
Risk assessed (traffic light system) evidence based preventative care pathway 
Risk assessed recall interval (NICE guidelines on dental recall interval), variations 
recorded  
Stakeholder feedback on delivery and 
impact of care 
Standard complaints/comments Patient forum 
nGDS, national General Dental Services; NICE, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence; UDA, Units of Dental Activity  
Table 1 Key characteristics of the traditional and new model incentive practices under evaluation in the INCENTIVE study 
To achieve a recruitment of 550 new patients in the INCENTIVE project, recruitment will take place 
over the six practices for a period of 6 months. We anticipate 10% lost to follow-up so this leaves us 
with an adequate sample of ∼500 for analysis. Recruitment is based on: (1) six dental practices 
included in the study that comprise 20 surgeries; (2) an average list size of 1000 adult patients per 
dentist; (3) 10% of whom per year will be new patients to the practice (estimated from the Dental 
Public Health audit figures of practices in Bradford and Airedale) and (4) of these 1000 patients we 
estimate a minimum of 50% will agree to participate in the study over the 6-month recruitment 
period. Thus at a practice level the three newly commissioned dental practices will be matched with 
three existing traditional practices of similar size, deprivation index, age profile and ethnicity, which 
are taking on new patients. At a patient level, inclusion criteria are that a patient must be above 16 
years of age, must be a new patient to the practice during the recruitment period (anticipated being 
6 months) willing to be followed up for 24 months, and must give informed consent and be able to 
complete the patient-completed questionnaires (if a translator is needed, the availability of 
provision of translation service in the spoken language of the participant will be via the normal 
dental practice access routes to such services). With regard to exclusion criteria and the specific 
handling of those who are edentulous, they will not be excluded from the sample, however, they will 
be considered supplementary to the core sample of 550 patients and provide additional specific data. 
Postcode, age and ethnicity of all patients included within the sample will be recorded and profiled 
during the analysis.  
To detect a clinically meaningful reduction in BOP of 10% and assuming a 10% drop out rate, 275 
patients are required in from the incentive-driven practices and from the nGDS practices to give 80% 
power with a significance level of 5%.  
Data will be collected at baseline and 24 months. BOP and ICDAS will be completed by the dental 
practitioner at the dental appointment. Training will be provided to all practices on use of the ICDAS. 
For the risk assessment, data from the traffic light system (refer to figure 2) will be collected 
outlining variations when the protocol is over-ruled by clinicians and why. Recruitment will take 
place over a 6-month period beginning in April 2012. The OHIP-14 and EQ-5D will be completed by 
the patients.  
Multiple linear regression will be used to model differences in BOP from baseline to 24 months. 
Changes in oral health quality of life will be explored using structural equation modelling to identify 
the relationships between changes in clinical status and patient perspective.  
Cost-effectiveness study 
Of key importance is that the new model of service delivery shows value for money. Economic 
evaluation will identify within-study incremental cost-effectiveness ratios for the incentive-driven 
service as compared to standard practice. Use of these ratios will enable comparison of any 
additional financial costs and benefits associated with the new model over standard care.  
The primary analyses will take the perspective of the commissioners of the service, taking account of 
differences in contractual payments and including only the costs of dental care. There is no 
preference-based dental outcome measure and thus the within-study analysis will estimate the 
expected incremental cost per point increase in OHIP-14 score. In addition, a second analysis will use 
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) estimated using utility weights for each health state observed in 
the trial population. We will use the EuroQol-5D (EQ-5D) instrument for this purpose.
12
 ,
13
 Within the 
study the OHIP-14 scores will also be mapped to the EQ-5D scores in order to add to the evidence 
base
14
 for the future development of a preference-based dental health-related quality of life 
instrument.  
While the primary analyses will adopt the commissioner perspective, secondary analysis will adopt 
the perspective of the service provider. Integral to this analysis is the exploration of variation of cost-
effectiveness results across locations given differences in case and skill mix. Thus the economic 
analysis will explore the differences in resource use given the skill mix and care providers by 
comparing cost and output across the new incentive-driven model of service delivery and traditional 
practices.  
The economic study will use the same sample and time frame as the clinical study. Health resource 
use associated with each treatment modality will be collected for each dental visit from dental 
practice records. The EQ-5D and OHIP-14 will be collected at the same time as the other outcome 
data. Patients will be asked to complete these measures at baseline and 24 months.  
Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios will be calculated as the difference between the mean costs 
and difference in OHIP score/QALYs in each arm. Non-parametric bootstrapping will be used to 
produce a within-trial probabilistic sensitivity analysis of the incremental cost-effectiveness ratios. 
The expected incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, a scatterplot on the cost-effectiveness plane and 
the cost-effectiveness acceptability frontier will be presented. Discounting will use the 
recommended rate at the time.  
Discussion 
The move to blended or incentivised contracts is gathering pace within the UK, yet there is mixed 
evidence on its usefulness. There are potential advantages; not least more efficient use of the dental 
team through greater use of skill mix. For example, dental therapists can extract milk teeth, place 
fillings and apply preventive medicaments, and dental nurses may give preventive advice and apply 
preventive fluoride varnishes to teeth. Intuitively, the delegation of treatment to staff specialised in 
only a specific range of treatments could reduce costs and increase access to care but this 
hypothesis needs testing.
15
 Skill mix is advocated in several current proposals for change that 
continue a trend seen in UK dentistry over the past 20 years.
2
 ,
16–19
 For example, dental therapists 
may now work in general dental practice,
17
 their clinical remit has expanded
20
 ,
21
 and recently, in 
March 2013, the GDC (General Dental Council) permitted direct access to some dental care 
professionals; hygienists and therapists can now carry out their full scope of practice without 
prescription and without the patient having to see a dentist first. While there are few hard data to 
support skill mix in dentistry,
15
 some data are beginning to emerge; for example, a recent practice-
based study found the success of fissure sealants placed by dentists, hygienists and therapists to be 
comparable.
22
 However, research is needed to assess whether new models of delivery and service 
design will encourage their use and whether they are acceptable to dentists and patients.  
Emphasis of the new incentivised contracts lies on quality and outcomes. While quality indicators 
linked to contracts and payments have been used widely in other branches of healthcare, the results 
are complex. The indicators can drive organisational change towards best practice, but may also be a 
disincentive to important but non-rewarded activities.
7
 Used alongside demographic data, the 
indicators can measure practice performance, identify areas for development and assist sharing of 
best practice.
23
 The indicators often increase the quantity of service provision, but not always the 
quality.
24
 While offering great potential, quality indicators have not been comprehensively evaluated 
in dentistry. A recent systematic review was only able to provide a framework for how such 
indicators might work.
25
 
In respect of improved health outcomes, the dental community is united that outcomes in terms of 
clinical effectiveness should focus on major public health challenges including caries and periodontal 
diseases where health improvement is needed. However, the community lacks consensus in how 
best to measure change.  
There is also little in the literature regarding care pathways in primary dental care, although the 
concept has been around for a number of years. The concepts and benefits of the care pathway 
approach in dental primary care were described by Hally and Pitts.
26
 As a result of government 
recommendations
17
 the first widely disseminated care pathway in UK dental primary care was the 
OHA within the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidance on dental recall 
intervals.
27
 The OHA care pathway was designed to enable more prevention within personalised care 
plans taking into account their social and dental histories as well as clinical findings. This pathway 
informs what to commission from the practices involved in this study but has not been fully 
evaluated in practice.  
The emerging service delivery models in the UK should include innovative use of skill mix, evidence-
based care pathways, funding and quality indicators.
18
 A robust evaluation of new dental contracts is 
called for,
1
 which is what this study aims to achieve.  
Study status 
The first patient for the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness studies was recruited in June 2012 and 
the last patient in January 2013. Recruitment for the qualitative study is on-going. The results will be 
reported in 2015. The research team provided the NRES Committee London-Bromley with a copy of 
the final protocol, patient information sheets, consent forms and all other relevant study 
documentation.  
Consent 
The direct NHS Dental team will perform an eligibility screen of all new patients to the practice 
based on the information the practice routinely captures when a patient joins the practice. Eligible 
patients will be given a patient information leaflet to consider, if they are willing to join INCENTIVE 
they will be consented and registered. This will result in them being assigned a unique patient-
specific study number that will then be used on all subsequent case report forms for data capture. 
For lay participants who are not currently seeing an NHS dentist but whom we would like to 
interview to understand access to dental care in the community, we will recruit using a mixture of 
approaches, such as the employment of snowball sampling techniques and site-based approaches to 
recruitment. Snowball sampling is a convenience sampling technique which involves an existing 
participant providing the researcher with the name of an individual who may also be interested in 
taking part in the research. This individual may be asked, in turn, to provide the researcher with a 
name of another potential participant. One of the main advantages of this method of recruitment is 
that it enables researchers to make contact with hard to reach populations.  
Confidentiality 
Access to medical records: Monitoring of patient notes may be undertaken by the authorised 
individuals from the study team, regulatory bodies, funder or Sponsor (University of Leeds) in order 
to check that the study is being carried out correctly. The Clinical Research coordinator will be 
University of Leeds employed and have oversight of day-to-day operations across work package 
(WP)1–3. There will be a similar research assistant coordinating the qualitative Workpackage 1 
based in the University of Sheffield. Electronic transfer: data will be sent to and from participating 
research sites, however, no patient-identifiable information will be sent via electronic means (use of 
coded study number, patient initials and date of birth (DOB) only). Should it be required to send any 
patient identifiable information (eg, for long-term follow-up data), then data will be sent password 
protected (with a complex password to be sent separately) to the appropriate person. We follow 
local guidance and Standard Operating Procedures, which ensure the Data Protection Act 1998 will 
be adhered to at all times.  
Use of personal postcode: Patient 4 digit postcode will be collected on the Consent Form for the trial, 
and will be kept separately to any other clinical data. The postcode and full name are being collected 
to allow for collection of deprivation index from standard local registries.  
The research team and participating sites will comply with all aspects of the Data Protection Act 
1998. All information collected during the course of the study will be kept strictly confidential. 
Participant name will be collected when the patient consents to the trial for long-term follow-up. All 
other data ĐolleĐtioŶ forŵs, eǆĐept the ĐoŶseŶt forŵ that ĐoŶtaiŶs the patieŶt͛s sigŶature, ǁhiĐh are 
transferred to or from the research team at University of Leeds or University of Sheffield will be 
coded with a unique study number and will include two patient identifiers: initials and date of birth.  
Dissemination policy 
An end of project national dissemination meeting will be undertaken with dental commissioners and 
a lay summary of project findings for circulation to study participants. It is anticipated that there will 
be two publications in international peer reviewed, high-impact journals and conference 
dissemination at the National meeting of the British Dental Association or equivalent and the 
International American Dental Research or equivalent.  
The chief investigator, co-applicants and senior management staff will be named as authors in any 
publication, and an appropriate first author agreed through discussion among the Study 
Management Group (SMG) members. In addition, all collaborators will be listed as contributors for 
the main study publication, giving details of their roles in planning, conducting and reporting the 
study. The INCENTIVE team will be acknowledged in all publications, as will the funder. Other key 
individuals will be included as authors or contributors as appropriate and at the discretion of the 
SMG. Any disputes relating to authorship will be resolved by the Senior Advisory Board/Steering 
Committee (SAB).  
The Chairs and Independent members of the SAB will be acknowledged, but will not qualify for full 
authorship, in order to maintain their independence.  
To maintain the scientific integrity of the study, data will not be released prior to the first publication 
of the results of the primary endpoint analysis, either for study publication or oral presentation 
purposes, without the permission of the SMG.  
The SMG will agree a publication plan and must be consulted prior to release or publication of any 
study data. 
Individual collaborators must not publish data concerning their participants which are directly 
relevant to the questions posed in the study until the main results of the study have been published. 
Local collaborators may not have access to study data until after publication of the main study 
results unless with agreement of the SMG.  
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